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ASCERTAINABILITY IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT:
NAME THAT CLASS MEMBER
Daniel Luks*
The 1966 amendment of Rule 23 provided plaintiffs with an extremely
powerful procedural device. Since then, much controversy has surrounded
Rule 23. Judges have often shown hostility towards certification of
frivolous class actions that result in large fees for attorneys but little
recovery for class members. The Third Circuit has recently used the
requirement that a class be ascertainable to create an extremely high bar
for certification of small-claims consumer class actions. Such class actions
in the Third Circuit are essentially fruitless unless a plaintiff can
individually identify all potential class members prior to class certification.
The Third Circuit is the first circuit court to use ascertainability to create a
bar to class certification. Class certifications will vary widely depending
on whether or not the circuit in which the class action is brought has
adopted the Third Circuit’s interpretation of ascertainability.
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INTRODUCTION
Kashi Brand, a producer of a variety of health foods, claimed to use only
natural, simple ingredients in many of its products.1 When purchasers of
Kashi products discovered that it used a wide array of artificial ingredients,
they filed a class action complaint.2 The complaint alleged that Kashi
engaged in deceptive advertising by saying that its products contained no
artificial ingredients.3
After determining that all of the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 were met, a judge in the Southern District of California
certified a class of all California consumers who had purchased a Kashi
product with a label claiming “Nothing Artificial” on or after August 24,
2007.4 Kashi had argued that the class could not be certified because no
records existed that allowed for easy identification of class members.5 The
court rejected this argument, noting, “If class actions could be defeated
because membership was difficult to ascertain at the class certification
stage, ‘there would be no such thing as a consumer class action.’”6
Had Astiana v. Kashi Co. been brought in the Third Circuit, the consumer
class would almost certainly have not been certified under
that circuit’s recent ascertainability doctrine jurisprudence.7 Traditionally,
ascertainability requires that a class be identifiable and “susceptible of
precise definition.”8 Under this standard, the Kashi class above satisfies
ascertainability.9 Although the requirement does not receive much
discussion, a recent string of Third Circuit cases has emphasized the
importance of ascertainability in small-claims consumer class actions.10
These cases make clear that to bring a damages class action in the Third
1. See Astiana v. Kashi Co., 291 F.R.D. 493 (S.D. Cal. 2013).
2. See id. at 499.
3. See id.
4. Id. at 510.
5. See id. at 500.
6. Id. (quoting Ries v. Ariz. Beverages USA LLC, 287 F.R.D. 523, 536 (N.D. Cal.
2012)).
7. See, e.g., Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 303 (3d Cir. 2013).
8. Jason Steed, On “Ascertainability” As a Bar to Class Certification, 23 APP. ADVOC.
626, 627 (2011).
9. See Astiana, 291 F.R.D. at 500–01.
10. See Carrera, 727 F.3d 300; Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349 (3d Cir.
2013); Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583 (3d Cir. 2012).
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Circuit, a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the
existence of an administratively feasible mechanism that allows the court to
identify all potential class members.11 Several scholars have recently
argued that the Third Circuit’s approach to ascertainability presents a
drastic shift in the application of the doctrine and creates a nearly
impossible bar for the certification of many small-claims consumer class
actions.12 This new approach to ascertainability provides defendants a
powerful tool to defeat class certification in most small-claims consumer
class actions.13
This Note explains the previously unacknowledged ascertainability split
in detail. Then, this Note argues that the Third Circuit’s approach is not
correct, because ascertainability developed as a doctrine to ensure that a
class be defined with precision. Ascertainability demands a class
definition, which allows the court to identify class members based on
objective criteria. The doctrine ensures the effectiveness of claim
preclusion as to class adjudication and that damages go to individuals
actually harmed by the defendant. However, it should not require that all
class members be identified prior to certification.
Part I of this Note briefly explains class action certification requirements
and identifies theories explaining the purposes of class actions. Part II
introduces the split regarding ascertainability and discusses the background
of the doctrine. Part III describes the arguments for and against the Third
Circuit’s novel approach. Finally, Part IV argues that ascertainability
should ensure the successful application of claim preclusion to any final
class judgment.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND OF CLASS ACTIONS
Before addressing the unacknowledged split regarding ascertainability, a
brief overview of the class action device is necessary. Part I.A describes
underlying motives of the class action device. Part I.B sets forth the
requirements for class certification. Lastly, Part I.C addresses the
development of ascertainability as well as the traditional understanding of
what is needed to satisfy the doctrine.

11. See Carrera, 727 F.3d at 307–08.
12. Brief for Professors of Civil Procedure and Complex Litigation et al. As Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 3, Carrera, 727 F.3d 300 (No. 12-2621), 2013 WL
4437225 [hereinafter Law Professors’ Brief].
13. See Nicole Skolout, Carrera v. Bayer Corporation: Third Circuit Vacates Class
Certification Order on Ascertainability Grounds in Consumer False Advertising Case,
MONDAQ (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/260302/Class+Actions/
Carrera+v+Bayer+Corporation+Third+Circuit+Vacates+Class+Certification+Order+On+As
certainability+Grounds+In+Consumer+False+Advertising+Case.
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A. The Purpose of Class Actions
American courts first used the representative suit device to ensure that
large groups of individuals with a common interest would not be prevented
from enforcing their rights.14 The modern Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23, which contains the requirements for class actions, was established in
1966 by amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.15 The 1966
revision of Rule 23 was intended to offer clarity to the class action device
and establish various procedural requirements for certification of a class
action.16 Class action litigation is an exception to the traditional rule of
individual adjudication and therefore has additional procedural and
constitutional requirements.17
Representative litigation is also an exception to the long held maxim that
one is not bound by a judgment in litigation to which he is not a party.18 A
similarly situated group, properly represented in a “class” or
“representative” proceeding, may be bound by a judgment even if not made
party to the suit.19 Rule 23 allows large groups of individuals to come
together and adjudicate many individual claims at once.20
While class actions are a procedural device, experts have noted that class
treatment necessarily eases plaintiffs’ costs in bringing many types of
claims.21 For example, small-value claims, which are commonly consumer
claims, do not individually provide the necessary financial incentives for an
individual to bring a claim.22 Class action adjudication provides plaintiffs
with the incentives to prosecute claims that previously would not have been
pursued.23 By making litigation easier for one party, class actions affect the
substantive balance between the two parties.24 Because Rule 23 is a
procedural rule that affects parties’ substantive rights, it has proven quite
controversial.25 Two traditional policy reasons that have been put forth to

14. 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1751 (3d
ed. 2005 & Supp. 2013).
15. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note.
16. Id.
17. See id.; see also Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940).
18. Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 41. “It is a principle of general application in AngloAmerican jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in
which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of
process.” Id. at 40 (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877)).
19. Id.
20. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
21. See Symposium, Some Reflections on the “Abusiveness” of Class Actions, 58 F.R.D.
299, 299–300 (1973) (featuring the Honorable Jack Weinstein and Professors Arthur Miller
and Geoffrey Hazard and discussing the effects of the modern amendments to Rule 23).
22. See Myriam Gilles, Class Dismissed: Contemporary Judicial Hostility to SmallClaims Consumer Class Actions, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 305, 305 (2010).
23. See id.; Symposium, supra note 21, at 300.
24. Symposium, supra note 21, at 300.
25. See id. at 301; Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights:
Myth, Reality, and the “Class Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 670 (1979).
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lend legitimacy to class treatment of individual claims are (1) the negativevalue conception and (2) the regulatory conception.26
1. The Negative-Value Conception
Benjamin Kaplan, a primary drafter of modern Rule 23, believed Rule 23
would allow for vindication of rights that would otherwise not be
adjudicated.27 Rule 23 “provide[d] means of vindicating the rights of
groups of people who individually would be without effective strength to
bring their opponents into court at all.”28 Kaplan believed that when the
stakes for each individual class member are large and each individual can
enforce his rights himself, class treatment is unnecessary.29 According to
Kaplan, class treatment overcomes a lack of incentive to pursue small
claims.30
The U.S. Supreme Court identified this compensatory function of class
actions in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.31 The Court noted that the lone
petitioner’s individual stake in the litigation was only worth $70;32
therefore, “[n]o competent attorney would undertake this complex antitrust
action to recover so inconsequential an amount. Economic reality dictates
that petitioner’s suit proceed as a class action or not at all.”33 For example,
notice in Eisen was prohibitively expensive.34 The Court, however, while
recognizing the importance of Rule 23 in litigating negative-value claims,
did not allow the plaintiffs to pass that cost on to the defendants.35 While
Rule 23 allows plaintiffs to enforce a substantive right that otherwise would
have gone uncompensated, plaintiffs must still bear the financial burden
needed to satisfy Rule 23’s requirements.36
In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,37 the Supreme Court reiterated this
view of class actions as a device for overcoming problems presented by
small recoveries.38 Class actions aggregate many small claims “‘into
something worth someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor.’”39 This aspect
of Rule 23, identified by the Supreme Court, is precisely what Benjamin
26. Gilles, supra note 22, at 305 (identifying the negative-value conception of class
actions); David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm Und Drang,
1953–1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 592–99 (2013) (identifying the regulatory conception
of class actions).
27. See Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497
(1969).
28. Id.
29. See Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5,
13–14 (1991).
30. See id. at 13.
31. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
32. Id. at 161.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 178.
35. See id. at 178–79.
36. See id.
37. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
38. See id. at 617.
39. Id. (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (1997)).
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Kaplan had in mind when drafting Rule 23.40 Aggregation allows for
compensation where none would have otherwise been practical.41
2. The Regulatory Conception: Private Attorneys General Model
Groups such as consumer advocates, civil rights practitioners, and
plaintiffs’ lawyers have identified the use of Rule 23 as a regulatory
device.42 “The regulatory conception treats Rule 23 as ‘an evolutionary
response to the existence of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of
government.’”43 The conception of Rule 23 as a regulatory device
stemmed from the understanding that class actions could serve as an
important substitute to public regulation.44
If regulation is the primary goal of a class action, individual remediation
is not essential to support the policy behind Rule 23.45 Although
compensating class members helps deter defendants’ general unlawful
conduct, the deterrence itself is the primary purpose, not the class
compensation.46 The defendant’s general unlawful conduct is most
important, and courts should attempt class certification to accomplish this
goal.47
Legal theorists claim that because of both budgetary issues and concerns
about capture,48 regulatory agencies are incapable of adequately enforcing
substantive law.49 Therefore, privately initiated litigation is necessary to
protect certain substantive rights.50 Although private litigation is an
important tool to implement many substantive rights, individual claimants
often do not have the incentives or resources to prosecute claims that
otherwise would go unlitigated.51 “[W]here harms are small and dispersed,
the defendants can avoid liability because no individual has sufficient
incentive to sue.”52 Rule 23 therefore responds to this issue and ensures
that more substantive law is enforced through private litigation.53
Private litigation through Rule 23 pushes enforcement of substantive law
to a more optimal point that regulatory agencies alone would not be able to
40. Kaplan, supra note 27, at 497.
41. 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1:7 (5th ed. 2011).
42. Gilles, supra note 22, at 309; Alexandra D. Lahav, Two Views of the Class Action,
79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1939, 1951–53 (2011); Marcus, supra note 26, at 590.
43. Marcus, supra note 26, at 592–93 (quoting Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445
U.S. 326, 339 (1980)).
44. See id.
45. See id. at 593.
46. See 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 1:8.
47. See id.
48. Regulatory capture occurs when “interest groups and political decisionmakers enter
into jointly maximizing relationships.” William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery,
Regulatory Competition, Regulatory Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L.
REV. 1861, 1885 (1995).
49. See Marcus, supra note 26, at 593.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 1:8.
53. See Marcus, supra note 26, at 593.
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achieve.54 Aggregation of claims now allows “an independent, wellfinanced cadre of private attorneys general to compensate for the
inadequacies of government regulators and individual litigants.”55 These
private attorneys general can utilize Rule 23 to deter defendants from
engaging in wrongdoing otherwise left unaddressed.56 Congress often
legislates with private attorneys general in mind by enacting damage and
fee provisions that enable private enforcement actions.57 For such
legislation to succeed in regulating private conduct, the class action device
must be available.58
Turning to the legitimacy of Rule 23, supporters of the regulatory model
would argue that the enforcement of substantive law provides the necessary
legitimacy to maintain class actions.59 Scholars have noted that private
suits aid public enforcement of laws and that the class action device is an
important factor in this enforcement.60 This view is supported by the
Supreme Court, which specifically identified classwide suits as a response
to “injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of government.”61 Class
actions also enhance judicial efficiencyspecifically in cases where
plaintiffs have large enough claims that they would individually pursue
those claims.62 While efficiency in small-claims classes may be more
suspect, these classes generate efficient enforcement of substantive rights.63
More efficient enforcement of legal norms, along with future deterrence, are
two important “positive externalities” that contribute to the efficiency of the
small-claims consumer class action.64
B. The Explicit Requirements of Rule 23
Rule 23, while designed to promote judicial economy, contains a number
of explicit requirements that must be satisfied in order to maintain a class
action.65 These requirements are in place to ensure that the rights of absent
class members are adequately protected, as the representative nature of
class actions necessarily limits the ordinary individual autonomy
characteristic of the adversary model.66 The procedural requirements that
must be satisfied prior to class certification also determine whether
maintenance of a class action is economically and administratively feasible,
coherent, and constitutionally permissible.67 Failure to satisfy any of Rule

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See id.
Id.
See, e.g., deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1231 (10th Cir. 1970).
See 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 1:8.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980).
1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 1:9.
See id.
See id.
See id.; 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 1753.
See 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 1:3.
See id.
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23’s requirements will result in a denial of class certification.68 For a class
action to be certified, all requirements of Rule 23(a) must first be
satisfied.69 A class action must then fit into one of three categories outlined
in Rule 23(b).70
The first requirement, Rule 23(a)(1), known as numerosity, focuses on
the number of potential class members.71 Numerosity requires that a class
may be certified only if it is so numerous that joinder is impracticable.72
Numerosity serves three important purposes: (1) it reveals the legal
system’s preference for individual litigation; (2) it works to ensure that Rule
23 is in fact an efficient way to litigate; and (3) it allows courts to consider
factors, other than the pure number of litigants, that may indicate that
joinder, a class action alternative, is impractical.73
Ultimately, the Rule 23(a)(1) numerosity requirement directs a court to
determine whether joinder is a better procedural device than a class
action.74 The lack of a strict threshold to meet numerosity reinforces the
idea that courts must engage with the facts thoroughly to determine if
joinder is impractical.75 Class actions often involve a wide range of
plaintiffs, but the key underlying factor that must be satisfied is that joinder
is never practical.
Rule 23(a)(2) requires that common questions of law or fact exist in
order to certify a class.76 Often referred to as commonality, 23(a)(2) is
satisfied if a single issue of law or fact exists for all class members.77 The
common question need not be both one of law and fact, but may be a
common question of either law or of fact.78 Because of the representative
nature of class actions, commonality ensures that the advantages of
representative litigation are actually obtained.79 If a common question does
not exist, then there is no basis to bind one litigant to the outcome of
another.80
The commonality requirements had long been settled until Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.81 In Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court stated,
“Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members
‘have suffered the same injury,’. . . . That common contention, moreover,

68. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
69. See id. R. 23(a).
70. See id. R. 23(b).
71. See id. R. 23(a)(1).
72. Id.
73. See 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 3:11. An example of the third rationale
for numerosity would be a situation where the court is not flooded with individual litigants,
but joinder may be impractical because of the small value of claims.
74. See id. § 3:11.
75. See id. § 3:12.
76. Id.
77. See id. § 3:18.
78. Id. § 3:21.
79. Id. § 3:18.
80. Id.
81. 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550–57 (2011).
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must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution.”82 The
Court emphasized the importance of the commonality question and pointed
towards a renewed focus on this prong of class certification.83
The latter two requirements of Rule 23(a), typicality and adequacy,
guarantee that the class representative has the proper qualifications to
represent the class.84 Rule 23(a)(3) requires that the claims or defenses of
the representative party be typical of the class.85 This requirement ensures
that the representative is in fact a member of the class.86 Rule 23(a)(3) also
presumes that a representative whose claim is typical of the class will
pursue not only his best interests but those of the class as well.87
Finally, Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the representative parties fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.88 Adequacy focuses the court’s
attention on the attributes of the individual seeking to represent a class.89
Because a class action binds absent class members, a certain level of
legitimacy is required to validate the binding effect of class adjudication.90
The Due Process Clause and class action procedure both require that absent
class members’ interests be adequately protected.91 Rule 23(a)(4) helps
stymie fears about binding absent parties by requiring that a class
representative pursue the interests of the class sufficiently such that any
judgment can fairly bind absent class members.92 Failure to satisfy Rule
23(a)(4) can reopen a class judgment to future judicial scrutiny.93 Because
class representatives are often given financial incentives, adequacy helps
guarantee that class representatives have the best interests of the class in
mind.94
If Rule 23(a) is satisfied, a class action must then fit into one of three
class action types set forth by Rule 23(b).95 Rule 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) are
mandatory classes that do not allow opt outs and generally do not seek
money damages.96 This Note focuses on Rule 23(b)(3) class actions—
damages suits—because that is where ascertainability issues generally arise.
Monetary damages may be sought as a remedy by Rule 23(b)(3) classes,
distinguishing them from Rule 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) classes.97 Because

82. Id. at 2551.
83. Id. at 2552.
84. Id. at 2553.
85. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3).
86. 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 3:28.
87. Id.
88. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
89. 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 3:50.
90. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 43 (1940).
91. Id. at 42–43.
92. 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 3:50.
93. See, e.g., Hansberry, 311 U.S. 32 (stating that a prior class action did not adequately
represent the current parties and could not bind those parties to the prior judgment).
Hansberry did not apply the requirements of Rule 23.
94. Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 959 (9th Cir. 2009).
95. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
96. Id. R. 23(b)(1)–(2).
97. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558 (2011).
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Rule 23(b)(3) classes seek monetary damages, the procedural requirements
reflect potential individualized determinations.98 The justification for this
class is the predominance of a common question of law or fact and a
determination that the class action is the superior method to fairly and
efficiently adjudicate the controversy.99 Not only must a common question
of law or fact exist, thus satisfying Rule 23(a)(1), but a common question of
law or fact must also predominate over all other issues.100 Rule 23(b)(3)
lists a number of factors that are intended to guide the court in its
determination of whether a class action is superior and whether a common
Aside from requiring predominance and
question predominates.101
superiority, Rule 23(b)(3) classes differ in a number of other crucial
aspects.102
Unlike Rule 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) class actions, class members of a Rule
23(b)(3) class action may choose to opt out of the class.103 23(b)(3) class
members must be provided with an opportunity to opt out of the class to
satisfy constitutional due process concerns.104 Courts must also direct
notice of the class action to all members who may be identified through
reasonable efforts.105 While this does not mean that each individual class
member must receive notice, each class member who may be identified
through reasonable efforts must in fact receive notice.106 If identification of
all putative class members at the time of certification proves impractical,
courts often direct notice through publication or similar means that will
alert the general public, and therefore presumably potential class members,
to the existence of a class action.107
Once a class action is properly certified, any judgment is binding on all
class members in subsequent litigation under the doctrines of issue and
claim preclusion.108 Claim preclusion applies if: (1) the second claim is
the same claim as the class action claim; (2) the second claim is between the

98. Id.
99. FED R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 1:3; 7A WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note 14, § 1777.
100. FED R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
101. Id. The matters pertinent to these findings include:
(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
begun by or against class members;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims
in the particular forum; and
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.
Id. R. 23(b)(3)(A)–(D).
102. See infra notes 103–07 and accompanying text.
103. See FED R. CIV. P. 23(c); 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 1777.
104. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985).
105. FED R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
106. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997).
107. Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 786 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Mullane
v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 309–10 (1950).
108. Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 874 (1984).
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same parties; and (3) the previous judgment was valid, final, and on the
merits.109
C. The Ascertainability Requirement
Part I.C discusses the origins of the ascertainability requirement and
common tests to determine if a class is ascertainable, and then introduces
the concept of subjective classes.
1. The Origins of Ascertainability
Ascertainability has traditionally been defined as the existence of a class
whose members can be identified by reference to objective criteria in the
class definition.110
Because ascertainability is an implicit element of Rule 23, courts have
found authority to require it in a number of sources.111 Ascertainability has
no universally agreed upon textual source.112 Courts therefore often make a
policy argument for ascertainability’s necessity.113 Those opposed to
imposing additional hurdles to class certification argue that Rule 23 itself
contains all of the necessary procedural protections to satisfy all “essential
issues of class action law.”114 Some courts discuss ascertainability
generally, but fail to mention any specific statutory language from which
such a requirement may be implied.115 While not deriving ascertainability
from specific statutory language, these courts tend to focus on the policy
reasons for implying a requirement of ascertainability in a class

109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 17 (1982).
110. See Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 668 F.3d 481, 496 (7th Cir. 2012); Steed,
supra note 8, at 627.
111. 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 3:2.
112. See id.
113. John v. Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 501 F.3d 443, 445 n.3 (5th Cir. 2007); Singer v.
AT & T Corp., 185 F.R.D. 681, 685 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
114. Blain v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 240 F.R.D. 179, 184 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (“Because
the same considerations in evaluating the sufficiency of the class definition are implicated in
the commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation analyses, and courts are charged
with analyzing all of the Rule 23(a) factors anyway, the sufficiency of the class definition
can be assessed in the context of the Rule 23(a) analysis without engaging in a redundant
exercise.”).
115. See generally Cunningham Charter Corp. v. Learjet, Inc., 258 F.R.D. 320, 325 (S.D.
Ill. 2009) (addressing how a proper class definition aids the court, but not where the
requirement of a proper class definition comes from); Bakalar v. Vavra, 237 F.R.D. 59, 64–
66 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (providing significant discussion about ensuring that class members be
ascertainable, but not providing any indication from where such a requirement is derived);
1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 3:2.
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definition.116 Courts that do provide a textual source for ascertainability
have identified three sources for the requirement.117
The first policy argument is that Rule 23 does not adequately vindicate
the purposes of class adjudication.118 In John v. National Security Fire and
Casualty Co., the Fifth Circuit noted that while “the text of Rule 23(a) is
silent on the matter, a class must not only exist, the class must be
susceptible of precise definition.”119 Ascertainability therefore demands a
certain level of precision from a class definition120 that will allow a court to
determine whether or not class treatment is proper.121 Neither Rule 23(a)
nor Rule 23(c) actually addresses how a class is properly defined.122 By
demanding an additional requirement of ascertainability, class definitions
allow courts to identify both the class and potential class members based on
objective criteria.123 Courts that accept this purpose for ascertainability will
then likely apply the doctrine to all types of Rule 23(b) classes.124
The second policy argument supporting ascertainability results from a
common issue facing class certification: proposed classes are often
indefinite.125 Focusing on ascertainability at an early stage allows courts to
directly confront problems facing class certification rather than attempting
to solve the issues using the traditional Rule 23(a) analysis.126 This
conception of ascertainability forces courts to apply the doctrine to all types
of Rule 23(b) classes, but courts need only raise the issue if the class
definition appears to be inadequate.127
The final policy argument for developing the implicit requirement is
concern for the due process rights of absent litigants.128 Ascertainability
deserves special discussion, because without any treatment of it, it “would
be unconstitutional to bind absent litigants to the results of aggregate
proceedings.”129 The class definition is critically important, because it
identifies those who deserve notice, are entitled to relief, and are bound by a
final judgment.130 Professor Martin Redish identified additional due
116. See Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593–94 (3d Cir. 2012);
1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 3:2 (naming policy reasons including “the
administrative burden and inefficiency that would result from an imprecise class definition,
the need to ensure that only plaintiffs who have been injured receive recovery, and the fact
that a precise class definition facilitates the ‘best notice that is practicable under the
circumstances’” (quoting Cunningham Charter Corp., 258 F.R.D. at 325).
117. 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 3:2.
118. See Grimes v. Rave Motion Pictures Birmingham, LLC, 264 F.R.D. 659, 664 (N.D.
Ala. 2010); RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 3:1.
119. John v. Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 501 F.3d 443, 445 n.3 (5th Cir. 2007).
120. See Steed, supra note 8, at 629.
121. Cunningham, 258 F.R.D. at 325.
122. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)–(c).
123. Boundas v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 280 F.R.D. 408, 417 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
124. See 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 3:1.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Singer v. AT & T Corp., 185 F.R.D. 681, 685 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
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process concerns in relation to a litigant’s individual autonomy to advance
her claim in the manner she deems most appropriate.131 If ascertainability
ensures that courts direct proper notice, then putative class members should
retain more individual autonomy.132 Notice in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action
allows class members to opt out if they do not believe that class
adjudication is the most effective or appropriate means of vindicating their
rights.133 Ascertainability therefore provides additional legitimacy to the
class action device.134
Turning to the statutory basis for ascertainability, some courts “imply
that the term ‘class’ in Rule 23(a) means a definite or ascertainable
class.”135 These courts reason that absent a definite class, the Rule 23(a)
prerequisites to certification cannot be applied.136 Courts cannot apply the
four requirements of Rule 23(a) without identifying the members of a
class.137
Finally, some remaining courts find support for ascertainability in Rule
23(c).138 Rule 23(c)(1)(B) specifies what must be included in a certification
order, but some courts have read this rule to also include the requirement
that a class be ascertainable.139 Specifically, Rule 23(c)(1)(B) instructs a
court to define the class.140 As ascertainability directly relates to class
definitions, Rule 23(c)(1)(B) seems to, at least indirectly, provide some
support for ascertainability.141 In addition to Rule 23(c)(1)(B), some courts
look to Rule 23(c)(2) to provide implicit support for ascertainability.142
Rule 23(c)(2)(B) specifies that in a Rule 23(b)(3) class, “the court must
direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be
identified through reasonable effort.”143 If ascertainability demands that a
class definition allow a court to identify potential class members, a court

131. MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE 136 (2009).
132. See Gibbs Props. Corp. v. CIGNA Corp., 196 F.R.D. 430, 442 (M.D. Fla. 2000);
Singer, 185 F.R.D. at 685; see also FED. JUD. CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
§ 21.222 (4th ed. 2004).
133. REDISH, supra note 131, at 169–70.
134. See 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 3:1.
135. Id. § 3:2.
136. See DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 1970).
137. 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 3:2.
138. Id. Rule 23(c)(1)(B) states, “An order that certifies a class action must define the
class and the class claims, issues, or defenses, and must appoint class counsel under Rule
23(g).” FED R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(B).
139. Standford v. Foamex LP, 263 F.R.D. 156, 174–75 (E.D. Pa. 2009); Riedel v. XTO
Energy, Inc. 257 F.R.D. 494, 506 (E.D. Ark. 2009); 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41,
§ 3:2.
140. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(B).
141. See Benito v. Indymac Mortg. Servs., No. 2:09–CV–001218–PMP–PAL, 2010 WL
2089297, at *2 (D. Nev. May 21, 2010) (stating that Rule 23(c)(1)(B) requires an order
certifying a class to define the class). Class definition is therefore an important
consideration at the certification stage.
142. Cunningham Charter Corp. v. Learjet, Inc., 258 F.R.D. 320, 325 (S.D. Ill. 2009).
143. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
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may then properly direct notice.144 Establishing a class definition that is
sufficiently definite is most important in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action,
because notice is required in a Rule 23(b)(3) class.145 Finding support for
ascertainability in Rule 23(c)(2) demands that courts address the doctrine
only in a Rule 23(b)(3) class.146 Rule 23 does not require that a court direct
notice for a Rule 23(b)(1) or 23(b)(2) class.147 As a result, a precise class
definition to determine who must receive notice is not much of a concern in
class actions other than in a Rule 23(b)(3) class.148
2. Tests For Ascertainability
Although ascertainability is an essential prerequisite for the maintenance
of a class action, no bright-line rules exist to examine whether a class is
sufficiently ascertainable.149 This determination is a fact-dependent inquiry
based on the unique circumstances of each case.150 Absent a clear
definition of ascertainability, courts focus on a number of criteria when
addressing the doctrine.151
Courts have developed three linguistic formulations commonly used to
test for ascertainability.152 The first test asks if the class definition is
“precise, objective, and presently ascertainable.”153 The second test
requires that “the class sought to be represented . . . be adequately defined
and clearly ascertainable.”154 The final test focuses on the presence of
“objective criteria” in the class definition.155
Although each test emphasizes various requirements that a class
definition must fulfill, courts tend to focus on the ability to identify a class
by objective criteria, because it allows courts to determine whether a class
is identifiable based on a clearly defined set of characteristics.156 In
applying this test, courts will typically find that “an identifiable class exists

144. See Boundas v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 280 F.R.D. 408, 417 (N.D. Ill.
2012).
145. In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 248 F.R.D. 389, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(“Identifying class members is especially important in Rule 23(b)(3) actions, in order to give
them the notice required by Rule 23(c)(4) so that they may decide whether to exercise their
right to opt out of the class.”).
146. See Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362, 1366 (1st Cir. 1972).
147. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c).
148. See Yaffe, 454 F.2d at 1366.
149. 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 1760A.
150. Id.
151. Cervantes v. Sugar Creek Packing Co., 210 F.R.D. 611, 620 (S.D. Ohio 2002)
(identifying a number of key elements to defining a class).
152. 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 3:3.
153. FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 132, § 21.222; 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 3:3.
154. Duchardt v. Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 265 F.R.D. 436, 443 (S.D. Iowa 2009);
Kelecseny v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 262 F.R.D. 660, 668 (S.D. Fla. 2009); Harrell v.
CheckAGAIN, LLC, 248 F.R.D. 199, 204 (S.D. Miss. 2006).
155. Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012); Fograzzo v.
Lehman Bros., Inc. 263 F.R.D. 90, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
156. See Boundas v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 280 F.R.D. 408, 417 (N.D. Ill.
2012); 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 3:3.
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if its members can be ascertained by reference to objective criteria.”157 For
example, requiring objective criteria in a class definition allows courts to
dispose of class actions based on the mental state of putative class
members.158 A number of courts in the 1970s developed ascertainability in
response to class definitions that required a court to delve into an
individual’s mental state to determine whether he was a potential class
member.159
3. Subjective Classes
Courts have been guided by a number of seminal class action cases that
provide analysis of what constitutes an ascertainable class.160 As early as
1970, the Fifth Circuit in Debremaecker v. Short, addressed the
ascertainability of a class of “residents of this State active in the ‘peace
movement’ who have been harassed and intimidated as well as those who
fear harassment and intimidation in exercising their First Amendment right
of free expression in the form of passing out leaflets in furtherance of their
cause.”161 The court noted that an essential element to maintaining a class
action is that the class be “adequately defined and clearly ascertainable.”162
This requirement was not met because the term “peace movement” was not
adequately defined.163 “Peace movement” could mean any number of
things, thereby precluding the court from identifying the “movement’s”
members.164 Thus, the court could not determine class membership.165
While the class definition in Debremaeker failed because it did not
adequately define “peace movement,” the definition also failed because it
included “those who fear harassment.”166 The court found that the chilling
effect the class representative complained of could not possibly reach all
Texas residents wishing to voice their opinion on the Vietnam War.167 A
class definition based on such an effect will typically fail to meet the
requirement that a class be ascertainable, because a court cannot determine
members who have been chilled absent individualized findings of fact.168
The Fifth Circuit’s rationale for denying class certification in

157. In re Methyl Tertiary Butly Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., 209 F.R.D. 323, 337 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (citing Zapka v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 99 CV 8238, 2000 WL 1644539, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 27, 2000)).
158. 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 3:3.
159. See Steed, supra note 8, at 627.
160. See Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 669–71 (7th Cir. 1981); DeBremaecker v. Short,
433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 1970).
161. DeBremaecker, 433 F.2d at 734 (emphasis added).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Cf. id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 1760 (citing Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655 (7th
Cir. 1981)).
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Debremaecker was an influential decision that provided guidance to other
circuits in relation to “mental state” classes.169
In Simer v. Rios,170 the Seventh Circuit confronted a similar issue of
“chilling.” The putative plaintiffs were individuals who qualified for, but
did not receive, cash assistance for fuel and utilities from the Emergency
Energy Conservation Program.171 The complaint defined the class as
“those individuals eligible for [public] assistance but who were denied
assistance or who were discouraged from applying because of the existence
of the invalid regulation promulgated by [the Community Services
Administration, a government agency].”172 To certify a class based on this
definition, the court would first have to identify those individuals who were
eligible for assistance.173 The court would then have to engage in the
“Sisyphean task of identifying those individuals” who not only qualified for
assistance, but who also knew of the existence of the regulation “and were
discouraged from applying for assistance because of the shut-off notice
requirement.”174 Any attempt to identify those individuals who were
“chilled” would burden the court in terms of both time and money.175
The court then noted that identification of class members helps courts
determine whether the class action device is the proper way to try the case
and ensures that only those harmed by the defendant’s conduct will be the
recipients of any eventual relief.176 In Simer, the court could not determine
based on objective criteria whether or not someone harmed by the
Community Service Administration’s actions should be a member of the
class.177 The only way to determine the members of the plaintiff’s class
would have been to engage in individualized findings of fact.178
Determining which potential class members were in fact discouraged from
applying for assistance is an individualized determination that, while not an
absolute bar to class certification, presented an “arduous task for the parties
as well as the district court.”179
II. THE UNACKNOWLEDGED SPLIT
REGARDING ASCERTAINABILITY
This Part first explains how courts typically apply the ascertainability
requirement. It then discusses the Third Circuit’s new approach.
169. See, e.g., Simer, 661 F.2d at 669.
170. Id. The district court failed to identify which subsection of Rule 23(b) the case fell
under, but “its reference to the concept of manageability implies a determination that this
was a 23(b)(3) class action.” Id. at 668 n.24.
171. Id. at 657–58.
172. Id. at 669.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 670.
177. Id. at 671 (noting that the district court properly denied class certification in light of
the difficulties of identifying individuals who both knew of the regulation and were
discouraged from applying for assistance).
178. Id. at 673.
179. Id.
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Although most circuits have acknowledged the need for ascertainability,
few circuit court decisions have addressed the issue directly.180
Nevertheless, the requirement that a class be ascertainable has long been
understood by a number of courts as an implicit prerequisite to class
certification.181 Although ascertainability is necessarily a prerequisite to
class certification, the exact application of ascertainability is an essential
question of an increasingly important requirement.182
A. The Traditional Ascertainability Approach: Ascertainability
Applied As a Definitional Requirement Demanding a
Precisely Defined Class Based on Objective Terms
Because few circuits have addressed ascertainability directly, little
discussion of the issue exists at the circuit level.183 As an implied
requirement of class certification, however, the issue of ascertainability is
often raised in district court decisions regarding class certification.184
Ascertainability ordinarily requires that a court be able to identify
individual class members without individualized trials.185 If a class
member can be identified solely by reference to objective criteria in the
class definition, the class will typically be ascertainable.186 Though
ascertainability receives only modest discussion at the circuit court level,
the Seventh Circuit recently addressed the requirement.187
180. Steed, supra note 8, at 626 n.2.
181. See Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 305 (3d Cir. 2013); Simer, 661 F.2d at
669–71; DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 1970).
182. Steed, supra note 8, at 626.
183. Id. at 626 n.2.
184. See, e.g., Fograzzo v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 263 F.R.D. 90, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 2009);
Parkinson v. Hyundai Motor Am., 258 F.R.D. 580, 593–94 (C.D. Cal. 2008). Because of the
high stakes in a class action, parties also tend to settle once a class is certified. See George L.
Priet, Procedural Versus Substantive Controls of Mass Tort Class Actions, 26 J. LEGAL
STUD. 521 (1997). A dearth of circuit court opinions regarding class certification orders has
likely led to minimal discussion of ascertainability at the circuit level.
185. See infra notes 188–234 and accompanying text.
186. See infra notes 188–234 and accompanying text.
187. Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 513 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating that plaintiffs
must show that the class is “identifiable”). More recently, the Seventh Circuit addressed
ascertainability in Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Public Schools, 668 F.3d 481, 493–97 (7th Cir.
2012). In Jamie S., the plaintiffs sought certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) class of learning
disabled students, who alleged that the Milwaukee Public School District failed to properly
implement the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. Id. at 484–85. Class certification
was overturned on appeal, because in addition to failing commonality and the requirement
that injunctive relief be applicable on a classwide basis, the class definition was indefinite.
Id. at 493. The class definition included a sizable number of students “who may have been
eligible for special education but were not identified and remained unidentified . . . . The
problem with a class of potentially eligible but unidentified students is not that their rights
might not have been violated but that the relevant criteria for class membership are
unknown.” Id. at 495. This class definition did not meet the definiteness requirement for
class certification, because the court could not readily identify a member of the class. Id.
Identifying students with learning disabilities is a highly individualized task that cannot
simply be accomplished by reference to some objective criteria. Id. at 496. Students with
unidentified learning disabilities, who according to the class definition were part of the class,
could not simply be identified by reference to criteria in the class definition. Id.
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In Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., the plaintiff attempted to certify a Rule
23(b)(3) consumer class action, claiming that Coca-Cola engaged in
deceptive advertising.188 According to the plaintiff, Coca-Cola led
consumers to believe that bottled and fountain Diet Coke contained the
same artificial sweetener.189 Membership in the plaintiff’s proposed class
only required the purchase of a Diet Coke.190 The Seventh Circuit affirmed
the district court’s decision denying certification because the class
definition “was not sufficiently definite.”191 A damages claim under the
Illinois statute at issue required that the plaintiff was in fact deceived and
damaged in some way by the deception.192 But membership in Oshana’s
proposed class did not necessarily require that the plaintiff be deceived.193
As the Seventh Circuit pointed out, “Some people may have bought
fountain Diet Coke because it contained saccharin, and some people may
have bought fountain Diet Coke even though it had saccharin.”194 The
court further noted, “Countless members of Oshana’s putative class could
not show any damage, let alone damage proximately caused by Coke’s
alleged deception.”195 Thus, the class definition would necessarily contain
some individuals who knew fountain Diet Coke contained saccharin and
bought it anyway.196
While the court emphasized that this class definition was not sufficiently
definite, and therefore failed to satisfy ascertainability, its discussion of
ascertainability was significantly enmeshed with typicality.197 Inclusion in
the class was independent of potentially having suffered any harm as
required by the Illinois statute.198 The proposed class was not identifiable,
because the class consisted of both harmed and unharmed individuals.199
Although the class definition itself was based on objective terms, the terms
did not identify a sufficiently definite class of individuals who may have
been harmed under the Illinois consumer fraud claim.200 The class
definition could not allow a court to identify individuals who were harmed
by Coca-Cola’s actions.201 The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Oshana
provided important precedent for district courts in applying the
ascertainability doctrine.202

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
2012).

Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 509–10 (7th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 509.
Id. at 514.
Id. at 513.
Id. at 513–14.
Id. at 514.
Id.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Steed, supra note 8, at 628.
See Oshana, 472 F.3d at 513–14.
See id. at 514.
See id. at 513–14.
See id.
See Boundas v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 280 F.R.D. 408, 417 (N.D. Ill.
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In Boundas v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., a court in the Northern
District of Illinois certified a Rule 23(b)(3) damages class, rejecting the
defendant’s argument that the class was not ascertainable.203 The
underlying facts involved a promotion giving a $25 gift card to any
Abercrombie consumer who purchased at least $100 worth of
merchandise.204 The promotional gift cards stated that they were
redeemable at any Abercrombie store and did not have an expiration
date.205 Abercrombie failed to maintain any records that would have
allowed the store to determine who received a gift card.206 When the class
representative attempted to redeem her gift card, she was told that the card
expired and had been voided.207 The plaintiff then sued Abercrombie and
sought certification of a class of:
All people who received Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. promotional
gift cards in hard copy stating “no expiration date” issued as part of a
2009 winter holiday in-store promotion and voided by Abercrombie &
Fitch Stores, Inc. on or after January 30, 2010 despite having credit
remaining on the gift cards.208

Although the class definition was based on objective criteria, Abercrombie
argued that the class was not ascertainable because with the exception of a
small number of individuals, class members could not be identified.209
Abercrombie’s argument failed because the district court determined that
individual class members’ identities did not need to be identified prior to
certification.210 The court found that ascertainability was not intended to
prevent certification because of a lack of records; rather, ascertainability
ensures that the class definition is sufficiently definite such that a court can
determine who should be in the class.211 Ascertainability demands that an
identifiable class exist, such that its members can be identified by reference
to objective criteria.212 As the court held, the class in Boundas “consist[ed]
primarily of individuals holding an Abercrombie promotional gift card
203. See id. at 417–18.
204. Id. at 411.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 417.
207. Id. at 411.
208. Id. The class definition was ultimately amended, and the certified class definition
was:
Persons who possess Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. promotional gift cards in
hard copy stating “No expiration date” that were issued as part of a 2009 winter
holiday in-store promotion and that were voided by Abercrombie on or after
January 30, 2010, and persons who discarded such cards because they were told
that the cards expired or had been voided, but not persons who received a refund of
the expired balance on their cards, not persons who lost their cards, not persons
who discarded their cards for reasons other than having been told that the cards
expired or had been voided, and not persons who gave their cards to somebody
else.
Id. at 418–19.
209. Id. at 417.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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whose value was voided on or around January 30, 2010. That criterion is as
objective as they come.”213 The class also consisted of those who threw
away their cards.214 While this criterion is not as objective as those who
retained their gift cards, these class members were required to submit an
affidavit to be evaluated during a claims administration process if the
plaintiffs were to prevail at trial.215
Finally, the court addressed how ascertainability impacts class notice.216
Abercrombie claimed that without identification of individual absent class
members, “notice by mail [could not] be effectuated.”217 Although
Abercrombie was correct in determining that notice by mail would be
nearly impossible, the Seventh Circuit’s doctrine does not require that
notice by mail be practical as a prerequisite to class certification.218 Notice
by publication would have been a sufficient substitute for notice by mail in
light of the circumstances.219 The facts of Boundas are quite similar to
other consumer class actions that have been dismissed on the basis of a lack
of records identifying potential class members.220
Astiana v. Kashi Co.221 is a consumer class action that presented the
court with similar questions regarding class member identification.222 In
Astiana, the representative plaintiffs brought a consumer class action
against Kashi Brands for allegedly deceptive advertising.223 The Southern
District of California certified a Rule 23(b)(3) class consisting of: “All
California residents who purchased Kashi Company’s food products on or
after August 24, 2007 in the State of California that were labeled ‘Nothing
Artificial.’”224 Kashi sold foods labeled as “all natural” or “nothing
artificial,” but the plaintiffs claimed that foods with this label actually
contained many artificial ingredients.225
Attempting to defeat certification, Kashi argued that the class could not
be certified because of the administrative difficulties involved in identifying
class members.226 Kashi claimed that because potential class members
likely do not have records or evidence of their purchases, “the Court will
have no feasible mechanism for identifying class members and will have to
pursue proof individual to each class member.”227

213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 418.
217. Id.
218. Id. (citing Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 786 (7th Cir. 2004)).
219. Id.
220. See, e.g., Weiner v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 07 Civ. 8742(DLC), 2010 WL
3119452, at *12–13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2010).
221. 291 F.R.D. 493 (S.D. Cal. 2013).
222. Id. at 500.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 510.
225. Id. at 498.
226. Id. at 500.
227. Id.
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The court disagreed with Kashi that the potential administrative burden
of identifying class members resulted in a failure to satisfy
ascertainability.228 The class definition at issue was in fact “adequately
defined and clearly ascertainable,”229 nor did it present any administrative
burdens that would prevent certification.230 The proposed class definition
properly identified purchasers of the defendant’s products that contained the
alleged misrepresentation.231 Notably, the court stated that because the
alleged misrepresentation was on the package of the products, there is no
concern that the class could include individuals not exposed to the
misrepresentation.232 According to the district court, allowing class actions
to be defeated at such an early stage due to difficulties in ascertaining
membership would essentially prohibit any consumer class actions.233 As
the court found, the definition need only be sufficiently definite to identify
putative class members, and challenges entailed in administration of this
class are not so burdensome to defeat class certification.234
B. The Third Circuit’s Heightened Approach
to Ascertainability
The Third Circuit diverges from the other circuit courts.235 Whereas
other courts hold a class ascertainable when class members are identifiable
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. Compare Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 513–14 (7th Cir. 2006), with
Astiana, 291 F.R.D. 493. In Oshana, the alleged misrepresentation was not included on any
package, so some people who bought the product may very likely not have been misled. See
Oshana, 472 F.3d at 514. In Astiana, however, the package itself featured deceptive
advertising. Astiana, 291 F.R.D. at 500. In Oshana, some people may have bought fountain
soda, because it in fact contained the artificial sweetener, and therefore those individuals
were not deceived. Oshana, 472 F.3d at 514.
233. See Astiana, 291 F.R.D. at 500.
234. Id.
235. While the Third Circuit is the first circuit court to accept this approach to
ascertainability, other district courts have used ascertainability to deny certification in smallclaims consumer class actions. In Weiner v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 07 CIV.
8742(DLC), 2010 WL 3119452 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2010), the plaintiffs alleged that Snapple
violated consumer protection laws by labeling certain products as “all natural” even though
the products contained high fructose corn syrup. Id. at *1. The class definition included all
persons who within the state of New York purchased a Snapple beverage labeled “all
natural” between 2001 and 2009. Id. at *2. The court denied certification, because
predominance was not satisfied, but the court also noted that the class definition would likely
fail ascertainability. Id. at *5–6, *12–13. To be ascertainable, the court must be able to
identify class members based on objective criteria that are administratively feasible. Id. at
*12. The plaintiffs argued that the court could require class members to submit a receipt,
bottle label, or sign a declaration confirming the purchase of a Snapple labeled “all natural.”
Id. at *13. As to the first two suggestions, the plaintiffs showed no evidence that consumers
retained a label or receipt. Id. Declarations would not adequately identify class members,
because putative class members “[were] unlikely to remember accurately every Snapple
purchase during the class period . . . .” Id. Soliciting declarations would invite putative class
members to speculate about their Snapple purchases. Id. In a case involving a similar set of
facts, plaintiffs alleged that Chipotle engaged in deceptive advertising by claiming that they
only served “naturally raised” meats. Hernandez v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., No. CV 12-
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based on objective criteria in the class definition, the Third Circuit further
requires that plaintiffs prove that an administratively feasible mechanism
for identifying class members exists.236 This rule was created through three
recent cases.
The first of the three was Marcus v. BMW of North America, LLC.237 In
Marcus, the named plaintiff sought to certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class “on
behalf of all purchasers and lessees of certain model-year BMWs equipped
with Bridgestone [run-flat tires (RFTs)] sold or leased in New Jersey with
tires that ‘have gone flat and been replaced.’”238 Marcus brought this class
action as a result of what he believed to be defective RFTs that came
equipped on his BMW 3 Series convertible.239 Marcus brought his claim
against BMW of North America, Bridgestone Tire, and a number of
Bridgestone subsidiaries.240 The initial complaint asserted claims of
consumer fraud, breach of warranty, and breach of contract claims.241
During his three-year lease, Marcus suffered four flat tires, costing between
$350 and $390 to replace each tire.242
Marcus initially attempted to certify both a nationwide class of 3 Series
owners and lessees and a New Jersey subclass against BMW and
Bridgestone.243 The district court denied certification of a nationwide class,
but granted certification with respect to the New Jersey subclass.244 Before
the Third Circuit considered whether the certified class satisfied the
requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b), the court addressed ascertainability:
“(1) whether the District Court clearly defined the parameters of the class
and the claims to be given class treatment, as required by Rule 23(c)(1)(B);
5543 DSF(JCx), 2013 WL 6332002 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2013). The judge denied class
certification, because the proposed class action failed Rule 23(b)(3). Id. at *1. Identifying
that common issues did not predominate over individual ones, the judge also alluded to a
failure to satisfy ascertainability. See id. Chipotle’s misconduct took place only at certain
locations within a specific time frame. Id. Plaintiffs would have to know with specificity
exactly where, when, and what meats they purchased to be included in the class definition.
Id. “In other cases, the class will be all purchasers of a particular product within some
reasonably large time period, so the details of the purchase are not significant.” Id. Credit
card records could potentially identify Chipotle transactions but would not identify the
specific type of meat purchased. Id. Thus, credit card records would only lead to more
individualized inquiries to determine exactly what type of meat was being served at the
specific location on the date of the transaction. See id. Although these two cases denied
class certification in part because of ascertainability, these cases are distinguishable from the
recent Third Circuit cases. In both of these cases, plaintiffs would be unable to identify
themselves as class members. Because of the type of claim, plaintiffs could not simply say
that they purchased a specific product and are therefore included in the class definition.
Hernandez specifically illustrates this point. While putative class members may have been
able to say that they ate at Chipotle on a specific date, this determination would not
necessarily result in inclusion in the class.
236. See infra notes 286–88 and accompanying text.
237. 687 F.3d 583 (3d Cir. 2012).
238. Id. at 588.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 590.
244. Id.
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and (2) whether the class must be (and, if so, is in fact) objectively
ascertainable.”245
On appeal, the Marcus court began its discussion of ascertainability by
noting that “[m]any courts and commentators have recognized that an
essential prerequisite of a class action, at least with respect to actions under
Rule 23(b)(3), is that the class must be currently and readily ascertainable
based on objective criteria.”246 The Third Circuit therefore appears to be in
line with a majority of courts, emphasizing objective criteria in the class
definition as the essential element in determining the ascertainability of a
potential class.247 Although the court claimed that a “class must be
currently and readily ascertainable based on objective criteria,”248 it also
held that “[i]f class members are impossible to identify without extensive
and individualized fact-finding or ‘mini-trials,’ then a class action is
inappropriate.”249 Individualized factfinding or mini-trials would challenge
the efficiency realized through class actions.250
Rather than solely relying on textual support for ascertainability, the
Third Circuit identified a number of policy and textual sources for requiring
the doctrine.251 First, requiring that all potential class members are
ascertainable eliminates any serious administrative burdens that may result
from an indefinite class and ensures that the efficiency benefits of a class
action are realized.252 Second, ascertainability “protects absent class
members by facilitating the ‘best notice practicable’ under Rule 23(c)(2) in
a Rule 23(b)(3) action.”253 Finally, ascertainability serves to protect
defendants and ensure that all class members bound by any final judgment
are clearly identifiable.254 By precisely identifying what ascertainability
meant and required, the court provided a framework for applying the
doctrine to class certification decisions.255
Turning to the specific issues of ascertainability at hand, the court took
note of a number of problems in objectively identifying class members.256
245. Id. at 591. Because the court discusses ascertainability and Rule 23(c)(1)(B)
separately, the court does not seem to find its justification for applying ascertainability in
Rule 23(c)(1)(B) as a number of courts do.
246. Id. at 592–93 (citing John v. Nat. Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 501 F.3d 443, 445 (5th Cir.
2007)).
247. See id. As noted earlier, whether or not a class definition is based on objective terms
is the question most courts focus on when considering the issue of ascertainability. See
1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 3:1.
248. Marcus, 687 F.3d at 593.
249. Id.
250. See id.
251. See id.
252. Id. (citing Sanneman v. Chrysler Corp., 191 F.R.D. 441, 446 (E.D. Pa. 2000)).
Eliminating serious administrative burdens seems like a policy goal of Rule 23(c)(1)(B)’s
requirement that the class definition be precise. Given that the court discusses this
requirement separately, this policy benefit seems to fit more appropriately elsewhere.
253. Id. (citing FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 132, § 21.222).
254. Id. (citing Xavier v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1089 (N.D. Cal.
2011)).
255. See id. at 593–94.
256. Id.
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“BMW claims that it ‘may be able to identify current and former original
owners and lessees of BMW vehicles factory-equipped with Bridgestone
RFTS which were initially purchased or leased from New Jersey
dealership.’”257 While BMW may have been able to identify lessees of
BMW’s factory equipped with Bridgestone RFTs, BMW counsel suggested
that BMW would not know exactly which vehicles fit the class definition,
because they did not maintain a parts manifest and would be unable to
identify which vehicles that satisfied the class definition actually had
Bridgestone RFTs.258 Additionally, some cars that arrived at a dealership
with Bridgestone RFTs may have left with different tires.259 BMW argued
that even if it could identify all cars with the proper tires, its “records would
not indicate whether all potential class members’ Bridgestone RFTs ‘have
gone flat and been replaced,’ as the class definition requires, because the
class is not limited to those persons who took their vehicles to BMW
dealers to have their tires replaced.”260 The court’s decision to reverse the
class certification order, while focusing generally on ascertainably, was
specifically concerned with the ability of defendant’s records to ascertain
potential class members.261
The court noted that if Marcus attempted to certify a class on remand, the
district court would need to “resolve the critical issue of whether the
defendants’ records can ascertain class members and, if not, whether there
is a reliable, administratively feasible alternative.”262 Any method
involving self-identification of class members would likely fail the court’s
requirement that class members be objectively ascertainable.263 Focusing
on ascertainability, the court in Marcus seemed to not only address whether
class members were objectively ascertainable, but whether potential class
members were identifiable based on the defendant’s records.264 Extensive
discussion of ascertainability in Marcus provided the Third Circuit with
important precedent regarding how ascertainability must be applied in
future Rule 23(b)(3) classes.265
Approximately one year later, the Third Circuit revisited the
ascertainability question with respect to a Rule 23(b)(3) class action.266 In
Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the Third Circuit vacated the district court’s
certification order and remanded in light of the Marcus decision.267 At
257. Id. at 593.
258. Id. (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Marcus, 687 F.3d 583 (Nos. 11-1192,
11-1193)).
259. Id. at 593. BMW claimed that some dealers would change the tires on a car at the
customers’ request. Id.
260. Id.
261. See id. at 592–94.
262. Id. at 594.
263. Id. A claims process utilizing sworn affidavits would likely fail, as this would
“amount to no more than ascertaining by potential class members’ say so.” Id.
264. See id. at 592–94.
265. See, e.g., Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2013); Hayes v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 351–52 (3d Cir. 2013).
266. Hayes, 725 F.3d 349.
267. Id. at 352.
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issue in Hayes was the sale of extended warranties on “as-is” sale items.268
Sam’s Club contracted with National Electronics Warranty Corporation
(NEW) to provide extended warranties called “service plans” for a variety
Although Sam’s Club
of items sold in Sam’s Club stores.269
indiscriminately sold the warranties, the service plans stated that NEW
“will not cover ‘products sold ‘as-is’ including but not limited to floor
models (unless covered by a full manufacturer’s warranty on your date of
purchase) and demonstration models.’”270 Sam’s Club employees sold
warranties on goods expressly excluded from coverage by the terms of the
service plan.271
When a customer wished to purchase an as-is item, a cashier would scan
the item.272 After the cashier scanned the item, the original price appeared,
at which point a cashier performed a “price override” and manually entered
the sale price.273 Although Sam’s Club software recorded price overrides,
the software did not record a reason for the override itself.274 Further, the
court highlighted that price overrides may occur for reasons other than the
sale of as-is items.275 Each individual Sam’s Club kept a handwritten log of
all items offered “as-is,” but the log did not record any actual transactions
involving sales of those items.276
After the plaintiff learned that the service plan sold to him by a Sam’s
Club employee was not valid on as-is items, he filed suit in the District of
New Jersey.277 The district court then certified a class of “[a]ll consumers
who, from January 26, 2004 to the present, purchased from Sam’s Clubs in
the State of New Jersey, a Sam’s Club Service Plan to cover as-is
products.”278 The district court found that this class definition satisfied all
of the prerequisites for certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class.279 Of note, the
trial court “found the class was ascertainable because members could be
determined with reference to objective criteria.”280
Although ascertainability was only one basis for overruling the class
certification order, the Third Circuit once again devoted extensive
discussion to what ascertainability demands.281 On appeal, Wal-Mart
claimed that the trial court did not consider how the class might practically

268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 353.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 354–56. Once again providing extensive discussion on the issue of
ascertainability, the court referenced the Marcus decision and the Third Circuit’s extensive
discussion of ascertainability, in that order, overruling class certification. Id. at 355.
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be ascertained.282 Wal-Mart argued that individual mini-trials would be
required to determine who was actually a member of the class.283
Addressing the purpose for the ascertainability requirement, the Third
Circuit found that ascertainability “focuses on whether individuals fitting
the class definition may be identified without resort to mini-trials.”284
Referencing the Marcus decision, the court identified two important
elements of ascertainability that the Marcus court highlighted.285 “Marcus
made clear that ascertainability entails two important elements. First, the
class must be defined with reference to objective criteria. Second, there
must be a reliable and administratively feasible mechanism for determining
whether putative class members fall within the class definition.”286
Although most courts recognize that a class must be defined with reference
to objective criteria, the need for an “administratively feasible mechanism”
to determine if class members fall within the definition is not a typical
requirement of ascertainability.287 According to the Third Circuit, an
administratively feasible mechanism can best be described as allowing a
potential class member to prove his membership through some form of
proof of purchase or other evidence, and then permitting a defendant to
challenge such evidence.288
As an essential prerequisite to class certification, the plaintiff is required
to show by a preponderance of the evidence that individual mini-trials are
unnecessary to ascertain identities of class members.289 Ascertainability,
like the other requirements for class certification, is an evidentiary standard
that the plaintiff must satisfy prior to a grant of class certification.290 To
satisfy this standard, a plaintiff would likely have to show that a class
definition is based on objective terms, and present the court with a plan
detailing an administratively feasible mechanism which would allow the
court to determine if putative class members actually fall within the
class.291 The ascertainability of a potential class cannot just be pled, but
must in fact be proven by the plaintiff.292
Because the trial court did not have the benefit of the Marcus decision,
the court failed to consider whether an administratively feasible mechanism

282. Id. at 354. Specifically, Wal-Mart raised “whether it is administratively feasible to
ascertain the class.” Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. (citing Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012)).
285. Id.
286. Id. at 355 (citing Marcus, 687 F.3d at 593–94).
287. Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 668 F.3d 481, 496 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that
identification of unidentified children with learning disabilities cannot simply be
accomplished by reference to some set of objective criteria); Fograzzo v. Lehman Bros., Inc.
263 F.R.D. 90, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“An identifiable class exists if its members can be
ascertained by reference to objective criteria.” (quoting In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig.,
248 F.R.D. 389, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2008))).
288. See Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 2013).
289. See Hayes, 725 F.3d at 354–55.
290. See id.
291. See id. at 355.
292. Id. at 354–55.
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existed to determine who exactly should be in the class.293 Although the
plaintiff failed to identify any such mechanism, the trial court found that the
plaintiff should not be barred from bringing a class action solely because
the defendant lacked certain records.294 But the extent to which a defendant
maintains its records has no impact on the plaintiff’s burden to fulfill all
necessary requirements of Rule 23.295 Rule 23’s implied requirement of
ascertainability could not be relaxed solely because Wal-Mart’s records
may have been inadequate.296 To be successful on remand, the Third
Circuit stated that the plaintiff would need to “show by a preponderance of
the evidence that there is a reliable and administratively feasible method for
ascertaining the class.”297
After Hayes, the Third Circuit again addressed the implication of
ascertainability on a Rule 23(b)(3) class certification in Carrera v. Bayer
Corp.298 In that case, the named plaintiff brought a Rule 23(b)(3) consumer
class action against Bayer Corp. over allegedly deceptive advertising of its
“One-A-Day WeightSmart” supplement.299 The supplement was sold in
retail stores until January 2007, although Bayer never sold the product
directly to consumers.300
In the District of New Jersey,301 Carrera “moved to certify a Rule
23(b)(3) class of Florida consumers under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair
Trade Practices Act.”302 The class was certified “as all persons who
purchased WeightSmart in Florida.”303 Bayer challenged the certification
order, claiming that class members were not ascertainable because of the
absence of retailer records indicating who ultimately purchased
WeightSmart.304 The court noted that class members were unlikely to have
retained documentary evidence of their purchases, and Bayer did not have a
list of purchasers, as it did not sell the product directly to consumers.305
The trial court considered Bayer’s objections to class certification based on
a failure to satisfy ascertainability but “characterized the issue of
ascertainability as one of manageability, stating ‘speculative problems with

293. Id. at 355. The trial court, in discussing numerosity, noted “that Sam’s Club had no
method for determining how many of the 3,500 price-override transactions that took place
during the class period were for as-is items.” Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 356.
296. Id.
297. See id.
298. 727 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2013). The appellee has since filed a motion for a rehearing
en banc. Appellee’s Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, Carrera, 727 F.3d 300
(No. 12-2621).
299. Carrera, 727 F.3d at 304.
300. Id.
301. The plaintiff brought suit in New Jersey court rather than Florida because Bayer is
headquartered in New Jersey. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 305.
305. See id. at 304–05.
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case management’ are insufficient to prevent class certification.”306 Bayer
then appealed the certification order, challenging the ascertainability of the
class.307
Recognizing potential issues in ascertaining the class, Carrera attempted
to devise two administratively feasible mechanisms to determine who was
in the class.308 The first method was to utilize retailer records of online
purchases and sales made with store loyalty or rewards cards.309 The
second proposed method to ascertain the class was for potential class
members to submit affidavits declaring that they purchased WeightSmart
and the amount they purchased.310 Carrera argued that affidavits would
satisfy ascertainability, because
[f]irst, due to the low value of the claims, class members will be unlikely
to submit fraudulent affidavits. Second, because Bayer’s total liability
will not depend on the reliability of the affidavits, the ascertainability
requirement should be relaxed. Finally, a screening method such as the
one described in the Prutsman Declaration will ensure any unreliable
affidavits are identified and disregarded.311

The plaintiff’s first argument for using affidavits failed, because the
value of the claims had no bearing on the purpose for requiring that a class
be ascertainable.312 The court noted that a “core concern” for requiring that
a class be objectively ascertainable is to allow a defendant to challenge
class membership.313 Just because claims are low value—minimizing
concern that individuals will submit fraudulent claims—this does not affect
a defendant’s ability to challenge class membership.314
The second argument supporting the use of affidavits to prove the class
was in fact ascertainable failed because, according to the court, the plaintiff
once again did not properly understand the interests which ascertainability
is intended to protect.315 In arguing the merits of an affidavit system, the
plaintiff noted that liability does not depend on the number of affidavits
submitted.316 Unlike Marcus, where the number of affidavits submitted
affected the defendant’s overall liability, liability here would be determined
at trial, and the number of affidavits submitted would therefore only impact
an individual class member’s recovery.317 The court observed, however,
306. Id. (citing Carrera v. Bayer Corp., Civ. A. No. 08-4716, 2011 WL 5878376, at *4
(D.N.J. Nov. 22, 2011)).
307. Id. at 304.
308. Id. at 308.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 309. The plaintiff’s third argument supporting ascertainability was denied by
the court because the Prutsman Declaration did not show how the affidavits would be
reliable. Id. at 310–12. The court was not satisfied that the screening method would satisfy
the ascertainability requirement. Id. at 311–12.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 309.
314. Id.
315. See id. at 309–10.
316. Id. at 310.
317. Id.
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that this method for ascertaining the class would dilute true class members’
recovery if damages were paid to fraudulent claims, and therefore would
fail to adequately protect the interests of absent class members.318 Failing
to adequately protect absent class members’ interests could allow class
members to argue that the named plaintiff did not adequately represent
them, leaving Bayer open to future suits.319 Because ascertainability
ensures that a feasible method of identifying class members exists,
fraudulent claims will not be filed and class recovery will not be diluted by
such claims.320 In the Third Circuit’s view, this interpretation of
ascertainability ultimately works to protect absent class members’
interests.321
The Third Circuit once again identified that when addressing whether a
class is ascertainable, “a plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the class is ‘currently and readily ascertainable based on
objective criteria,’ and a trial court must undertake a rigorous analysis of
the evidence to determine if the standard is met.”322 Carrera could not
simply plead that an administratively feasible mechanism for identifying
class members existed; rather, he had to show that such a method existed.323
The ascertainability question in Carrera was whether each class member
actually purchased WeightSmart in Florida.324 Although class actions
aggregate many individual claims, a defendant still has a due process right
to challenge each claim, and class certification does not preclude this
right.325 Due process rights are not limited to challenging the claim itself,
but extend to the proof used to demonstrate class membership.326
Therefore, ascertainability protects a defendant’s due process rights by
“requiring that a defendant be able to test the reliability of the evidence
submitted to prove class membership.”327
The court found that for Carrera to satisfy the requirement that the class
be ascertainable, he had to demonstrate an administratively feasible and
reliable method for ascertaining class members, which would also permit a
defendant to challenge the evidence utilized to prove such membership.328
Carrera failed to establish facts proving that the conditions needed to satisfy
ascertainability were met, and the Third Circuit therefore overruled the
district court and denied class certification.329

318. Id.
319. Id. “When class members are not adequately represented by the named plaintiff,
they are not bound by the judgment.” Id. (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42 (1940)).
320. Id.
321. See id.
322. Id. at 306 (quoting Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir.
2012)).
323. See id. at 307.
324. Id. at 304–05.
325. Id. at 307.
326. Id. (citing Marcus, 687 F.3d at 594).
327. Id.
328. See id. at 307–08.
329. Id. at 304.
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III. THE POLICY ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE TWO DIFFERENT
APPLICATIONS OF ASCERTAINABILITY
This Part examines the policy arguments for the two distinct approaches
to ascertainability. Part III.A discusses various policy reasons for applying
the traditional approach to ascertainability. Part III.B identifies and
examines arguments supporting the Third Circuit’s approach.
A. The Policy Reasons for the Traditional Approach
to Ascertainability
In light of a traditionally liberal interpretation of Rule 23, individual class
members need not be identifiable at the class certification stage.330 Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 1 states that the Rules of Civil Procedure “should
be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.”331 In Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin,332 the Second Circuit held that Rule 23 should be given a liberal
rather than restrictive interpretation.333 Ascertainability, in the traditional
sense, demands that a class definition be precise and based on objective
terms.334 Prior to class certification, only “membership of the class must be
ascertainable.”335
Courts that discuss ascertainability ordinarily invoke the doctrine when
evaluating a class definition.336 Ascertainability is an important implied
requirement of class certification because it guarantees that an identifiable
class in fact exists.337 If an identifiable class does not exist, then there is no
entity that can satisfy the requirements of Rule 23.338 Because Rule 23
applies to absent parties, an ascertainable class is one that exists and can
fulfill Rule 23’s requirements.339 The existence of a class is a question of
fact to be determined based on the circumstances.340 A precise definition
based on objective terms allows a judge to make such a determination
regarding the existence of a class.341 The traditional definition of
ascertainability successfully identifies whether or not a class in fact
exists.342

330. 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 1760; see also FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 132,
§ 21.222, at 270 (“Although the identity of individual class members need not be ascertained
before class certification, the membership of the class must be ascertainable.”).
331. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
332. 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968), aff’d, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 14, § 1754.
333. Eisen, 391 F.2d at 563.
334. Steed, supra note 8, at 627.
335. FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 132, § 21.222.
336. See Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 669 (7th Cir. 1981); DeBremaecker v. Short, 433
F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 1970).
337. See Steed, supra note 8, at 627.
338. Id.
339. See generally id.
340. 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 1760.
341. Cf. FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 132, § 21.222.
342. DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 1970).
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Applying the conventional definition of ascertainability allows courts to
identify class members, because objective terms in the class definition
either include or exclude someone as a class member.343 Absent such a
class definition, a court would have to undergo individualized findings of
fact to establish who could be a class member—therefore undoing the
efficiency that class actions are intended to create.344 An important aspect
of ascertainability is that any class definition also be administratively
feasible.345 Any class definition must be “sufficiently definite so that it is
administratively feasible for the court to determine whether a particular
individual is a member.”346 Emphasizing that class definitions be based on
objective terms satisfies this requirement, because courts can determine
membership without delving into the merits of the claims themselves.347
Courts need only look at the class definition and a putative class member’s
conduct or actions to determine whether he fits within the class
definition.348
Rule 23 is a complex rule of procedure that contains a variety of
requirements relating to various stages of the class action process.349 Rule
23(b)(3) importantly specifies determinations that a court must make in
concluding whether class treatment is appropriate.350 If common issues of
law or fact do not predominate over individual ones, or if a class action is
not superior to other available methods for fairly adjudicating the
controversy, a court may not certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class.351 While
concerns about the ability to identify absent class members may be raised
when addressing a class definition, demanding that a class be ascertainable
is sufficiently distinct from “the notion that individual class members must
be identifiable at the class certification stage.”352 Once a class is identified,
a court can decide whether or not a class action is an efficient means of
adjudication.353 Manageability is explicitly listed as a factor courts should
consider when determining if a class action is superior to other methods of
343. Boundas v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 280 F.R.D. 408, 417–18 (N.D. Ill.
2012).
344. 1 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:2 (10th ed. 2013).
345. Kirkman v. N.C. R.R. Co., 220 F.R.D. 49, 53 (M.D.N.C. 2004).
346. 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 1760A.
347. See Parkinson v. Hyundai Motor Am., 258 F.R.D. 580, 594 (C.D. Cal. 2008);
1 MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 344, § 4:2. Alternatively, courts can look at the administratively
feasible aspect of ascertainability from the prospective of class members. Under this
framework, courts will typically find a class ascertainable “when the class definition
contained a particular make, model, and production period for the vehicle that was the
subject of the litigation.” 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 3:3. Class members should
be able to identify themselves as having a right to recovery based on the class description. Id.
348. Cf. Cervantes v. Sugar Creek Packing Co., 210 F.R.D. 611, 620 (S.D. Ohio 2002).
349. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
350. Id. R. 23(b)(3).
351. Id. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure list a number of factors that inform courts
as to the question of whether or not a class action is superior to other methods. Specifically,
one factor that courts should consider is the difficulties in managing a class action. Id. R.
23(b)(3)(D).
352. Cf. Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 12, at 3.
353. See Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 670 (7th Cir. 1981).
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adjudication.354 If a court finds that absent class members cannot readily be
identified, a court can deny class certification on manageability grounds.355
B. The Policy Arguments Supporting the
Third Circuit Approach
In Carrera v. Bayer Corp.,356 the Third Circuit identified three distinct
policy reasons for applying a more rigorous application of ascertainability
prior to class certification.357 First, “ascertainability and a clear class
definition allow potential class members to identify themselves for purposes
of opting out of a class.”358 Unlike Rule 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) class
actions, Rule 23(b)(3) class members have an absolute right to opt out.359
Failure to exercise an opt-out right will bind a putative Rule 23(b)(3) class
member to any future judgment.360 The right to opt out is an essential
characteristic of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action because it allows individuals to
pursue their own claims if they desire to do so.361 Opt-out rights balance
the benefits gained through class action litigation along with the right to
individually litigate a claim.362 The ability to opt out satisfies constitutional
concerns about representative litigation.363
Because Rule 23(b)(3) classes primarily seek monetary damages, opt-out
rights allow those individuals with stronger claims to opt out and litigate—
or not litigate—on their own.364 As compared to a class seeking injunctive
relief, class members’ interests in a damages class are less likely to be
aligned.365 Exclusion rights are essential for putative damage class
members who desire to individually litigate their claims.366
While Rule 23 does not directly protect class members’ opt-out rights, it
does so indirectly through the notice provision.367 Notice, which must be
354. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(D).
355. Ballard v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 284 F.R.D. 9, 13–15 (D.D.C. 2012) (stating
that where the court could not practically identify class members, proper notice could not be
directed and the court therefore denied class certification on manageability grounds).
356. 727 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2013).
357. See id. at 307.
358. Id.
359. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); see also 3 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 9:40.
360. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
361. See generally 3 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 9:38.
362. In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 221 F.3d 870, 881 (6th Cir. 2000).
363. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985).
364. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig. MDL No. 381, 818 F.2d 145, 165–66 (2d
Cir. 1987).
365. See 3 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 9:40. In a Rule 23(b)(2) class, injunctive
or declaratory relief must be appropriate respecting the class as a whole. Therefore, for a
Rule 23(b)(2) class to be properly certified, all class members’ interests must align.
366. See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812.
367. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B); 3 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 9:41.
For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must direct to class members
the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual
notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The notice
must clearly and concisely state in plain, easily understood language . . . that the
court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion . . . .
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
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provided in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action, must inform class members of
their right to opt out of the class action.368 Absent class members may not
be afforded their right to opt out if notice is not received.369 Ultimately, the
Third Circuit’s approach to ascertainability would ensure that all putative
class members have an opportunity to opt out of class treatment.370
Demanding that the plaintiff submit an administratively feasible method to
determine the identity of each class member would allow potential class
members to receive notice, thus guaranteeing that opt out rights can be
exercised if desired.371 Because class actions are an exception to the
traditional rule that nonparties are not bound by the judgment, opt-out rights
are an essential protection of due process.372 If the Third Circuit’s
interpretation of ascertainability better directs notice, due process concerns
of class adjudication should be minimized.373
Focusing on absent class members, the Third Circuit’s definition of
ascertainability importantly protects any absent plaintiff’s right to fully
recover damages that may be awarded.374
Because this view of
ascertainability demands that all potential class members be identifiable by
an administratively feasible method, only individuals who are truly class
members will ultimately be able to recover any damages.375 Absent class
members need not fear that their recovery will be diminished by fraudulent
claims.376 Class actions create due process concerns regarding class
members’ rights, but Rule 23 also may deprive a defendant of his due
process rights.377
The second policy reason for a more exacting application of the
ascertainability doctrine is that it protects a defendant’s due process rights
once a class action is certified.378 A defendant’s due process right to
challenge the proof used to establish class membership is not diminished
solely because litigation proceeds as a class action.379 The Third Circuit’s
ascertainability test supports due process because it allows a defendant to
reliably examine evidence used to prove class membership.380 Affidavits
alone are not sufficient to prove class membership, because a defendant
would be required to accept as true affidavits of absent class members.381
A defendant would not be afforded an opportunity to individually challenge
all claims of absent class members if affidavits are an acceptable alternative
368. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v).
369. See, e.g., Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 2013).
370. Id.
371. See id.
372. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985).
373. See, e.g., Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012).
374. Carrera, 727 F.3d at 310.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 307.
378. Id.
379. Id. (citing Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 594 (3d Cir. 2012)).
380. Id.
381. Marcus, 687 F.3d at 594. While this is true, this seems to ignore that a successful
claims process can occur which would be able to eliminate fraudulent claims.
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to proving class membership.382 Ascertainability identifies all true class
members, prevents fraudulent claims, and ensures that class members are
adequately represented.383 If a defendant is ultimately forced to pay out
fraudulent claims, absent class members could argue that they were not
adequately represented and therefore not bound by the judgment.384
Scholars often justify representative litigation because of the efficiency
associated with litigating many individual claims at once.385 Yet if class
actions require an administratively burdensome process to determine who
should be in the class, much of the desired efficiency will be lost.386 The
Third Circuit claims that its theory of ascertainability demands efficiency,
and thus addresses one of the important policy goals of a class action.387
Because the Third Circuit requires a plaintiff to “demonstrate his purported
method for ascertaining class members is reliable and administratively
feasible,”388 a burdensome administrative process is no longer necessary to
determine class membership.389 Courts will easily be able to determine
those truly entitled to class membership while conserving precious judicial
resources.390
Lastly, while plaintiffs and society generally may benefit from the pursuit
of small-value claims, lawyers have benefited enormously from this
representative litigation.391 The aggregation of many small claims into a
single suit often results in large settlements, from which attorneys are paid a
rewarding fee for their work.392 For example, between 2005 and 2007,
there have been roughly 100 securities class action settlements in federal
court each year.393 The settlements have involved between $7 billion and
$17 billion per year, of which a mean and median of 20 to 30 percent can be
attributed to attorney’s fees.394 Judges may fear that plaintiffs’ attorneys
conjure up class actions as a means of seeking compensation.395 The plain
text of Rule 23(b)(3) is also quite advantageous to plaintiffs and
significantly eases plaintiffs’ ability to bring suit.396 Interpreting Rule
23(b)(3) class actions as an attorney-driven piece of litigation tends to cast
382. See id.
383. Carrera, 727 F.3d at 305–06.
384. Id. at 310 (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42 (1940)). In Hansberry, the
Supreme Court held that to satisfy due process, absent class members’ interests must be
adequately represented to be bound by the judgment. Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 42.
385. See 1 MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 344, § 4:2; 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14,
§ 1751.
386. See generally Carrera, 727 F.3d at 307.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 308.
389. Cf. id. at 307–08.
390. Cf. id.
391. Cf. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their
Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL STUD. 811, 814–15 (2010).
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 238–39 (9th Cir. 1974) (Duniway,
J., concurring).
396. See supra notes 23–26 and accompanying text.
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doubt on the appropriateness of class actions.397 In the same manner that it
would limit overinclusive classes, the Third Circuit’s heightened approach
to ascertainability could curb this attorney-driven litigation.
IV. COURTS SHOULD APPLY ASCERTAINABILITY SO AS NOT TO
DESTROY CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS
Ascertainability, as traditionally applied, ensures that class damages can
be distributed to those actually harmed398 and that class members are
precluded from relitigating a valid final judgment.399 Relying on objective
terms in the class definition to identify putative class members should
guarantee that these two purposes of ascertainability are realized. The
modern amendments to Rule 23 provided plaintiffs with a procedurally
efficient and cost-effective means of adjudicating many claims.400 Rule
23(b)(3) drastically changed the landscape of representative litigation and
created a strong bias in favor of plaintiffs.401
Ascertainability as applied by the Third Circuit presents a potent tool for
defendants to defeat many if not all small-claims consumer class actions.402
Any proposed class action where potential class members do not have
individual records proving membership in the class and defendants also
have not maintained records indicating class membership will fail
ascertainability according to the Third Circuit.403 Many negative-value
suits fall into this category, because few consumers keep receipts of boxes
of cereal they consumed or weight loss supplements they purchased. The
Third Circuit’s understanding of ascertainability, while attempting to
prevent many frivolous class actions, goes too far in establishing a bar to
class certification. The ascertainability doctrine as described in Carrera
prohibits a type of representative litigation that, for over forty years, has
become an accepted—albeit controversial—piece of the American legal
system.404
While class actions such as the one presented to the court in Carrera
expend significant judicial resources and result in little recovery for class
members, the novel approach to ascertainability tips the balance too far in
favor of defendants. In light of its limited resources, the federal judiciary
rightly emphasizes conservation of judicial resources. While this should
and likely will remain a main concern of the judiciary, courts should also be
concerned with administering justice efficiently.405 Ascertainability, if used

397. See Kline, 508 F.2d at 236 (Duniway, J., concurring).
398. Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 670 (7th Cir. 1981).
399. McBean v. City of N.Y., 260 F.R.D. 120, 132–33 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
400. See supra notes 27–40 and accompanying text.
401. See supra notes 27–40 and accompanying text.
402. See Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 12, at 10.
403. See supra notes 312–23 and accompanying text.
404. See supra notes 29–66 and accompanying text.
405. See Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 688 (7th Cir. 1981) (Swygert, J., dissenting) (“The
majority characterizes as ‘Sisyphean’ the job of identifying those qualified persons who were
discouraged from applying for assistance. Although I agree with the majority that such a

2394

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

to both ensure future claim preclusion and guarantee that those harmed by a
defendant’s conduct receive any damages, allows for both justice and
efficient uses of the court system.
If courts are unable to determine the members of class litigation, then it
will also be nearly impossible to determine who is bound by the preclusive
effect of any judgment.406 Ascertainability should serve primarily as a
requirement to ensure the workability of claim preclusion. Because class
actions bind any member of the class to any final and valid judgment, class
members who have not opted out are precluded from relitigating the
identical claim.407 If later courts cannot determine precisely who is bound
by an earlier judgment, then claim preclusion does not adequately prevent
absent class members from attempting to relitigate a claim.408 Soon after a
motion for class certification, courts must use ascertainability as a test to
determine the feasibility of claim preclusion in relation to the class
definition.
Using ascertainability simply as an early measure of the effectiveness of
claim preclusion is a lower bar to meet than that set by the Third Circuit.
Plaintiffs should only need to show that a court can determine based on
objective criteria who is a member of the class, and that any class members
will be claim precluded from bringing the same claim in a future case. An
inability to show that a future court will be able to identify someone as a
class member should result in a failure to satisfy ascertainability.409 A class
definition based on objective terms under most circumstances then satisfies
this requirement. Consider Boundas—if a future court can see that a
plaintiff had received a gift card to Abercrombie & Fitch between certain
dates, then that court can easily identify this individual as a class member of
a prior class and therefore bound by the judgment.410 But when a class
definition, such as the one in Simer v. Rios that included members
“discouraged” from applying for assistance, does not allow a court to easily
recognize who is bound by the class judgment, then ascertainability as it
relates to claim preclusion fails.411 The class definition in Simer would not
have allowed later courts to determine who was bound by a class judgment,
and, therefore, who would have been claim precluded.412 Thus, if a court is
unable to determine who would be claim precluded as a result of class
adjudication, then judicial economy is not properly served and the class
should not be certified.
For a class definition to satisfy ascertainability, a court must look at two
factors: (1) Is the class definition based on objective terms that will easily
allow a court to identify someone as a class member? And (2) does the
procedure would be a burden on the court, I believe that in certain cases considerations of
justice require courts to undertake those tasks; I would find this to be such a case.”).
406. See Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012).
407. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text.
408. See Marcus, 687 F.3d at 593.
409. See supra notes 160–80 and accompanying text.
410. See supra notes 211–16 and accompanying text.
411. See supra notes 176–79 and accompanying text.
412. See supra notes 171–80 and accompanying text.
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class definition adequately ensure that all class members will be precluded
from bringing the identical claim in a later proceeding? If both questions
are answered in the affirmative, then ascertainability has been satisfied. A
failure to fulfill either requirement would mean that a class is not
ascertainable and therefore the class definition must fail. Further, if a class
definition passes both prongs, the court will likely be able to identify those
individuals actually harmed by the defendant’s conduct. In most cases, the
emphasis should be on the first question, because the use of objective terms
in the class definition is a necessary predicate to ensure the ability to
identify class members bound by the judgment.
Because members of any properly certified Rule 23 class are bound by a
judgment, ascertainability then should apply to all variations of Rule 23
class actions. While some courts emphasize ascertainability only in relation
to Rule 23(b)(3), if ascertainability is meant to ensure judicial efficiency,
then it necessarily should apply to all classes. Applying ascertainability to
all Rule 23 classes is in line with Rule 23’s overall goal of promoting
efficient adjudication of claims.413
The Third Circuit’s concern with efficiency and frivolous class actions
was likely motivation for applying ascertainability in such a way as to
safeguard against those concerns.414 But utilizing ascertainability to require
that a court be able to identify all class members renders the manageability
consideration of superiority as surplusage. If a court finds that a class
action is not efficient because class members cannot be identified through
the use of records or a claims process, then it can deny class certification
based on manageability concerns.415 “[W]hether the court is likely to face
difficulties managing a class action bears on whether the proposed class
satisfies the predominance and superiority requirements.”416 Transforming
ascertainability into a requirement demanding that a class action be
administratively feasible diminishes the superiority inquiry.
While
ascertainability is intertwined with manageability, the two are distinct
concepts in relation to class certification.417 Ascertainability turns on the
definition of the proposed class, whereas manageability assesses the
practical problems that may render a class action inappropriate.418

413. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
414. Cf. Gilles, supra note 22, at 307 (describing generally judicial hostility to smallclaims class actions, and courts’ application of ascertainability regarding such classes).
415. Cf. id. at 310–11.
416. Seijas v. Republic of Arg., 606 F.3d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 2010).
417. See Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 12, at 3. In Weiner v. Snapple Beverage
Corp., 07 CIV. 8742 DLC, 2010 WL 3119452, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2010), the court
addressed manageability as a separate requirement from ascertainability. The court pointed
out that while ascertainability and manageability are related, the two are also distinct
concepts. Id. The size of the potential class itself in Weiner would likely have resulted in a
failure to satisfy manageability.
418. Weiner, 2010 WL 3119452, at *12.
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CONCLUSION
Ascertainability developed as a doctrine to ensure that courts can
determine who is bound by a class judgment.419 Maintaining it as such
focuses courts’ attention to the definition of a class and ensures that
plaintiffs attempt only to certify classes with a precise definition. While
individual identification is an appropriate concern of courts, ascertainability
defines the contours of who is bound by a class judgment and therefore a
member of the class.
Recent developments in the Third Circuit have called into question the
viability of Rule 23 in small-claims consumer class actions.420 The Third
Circuit has established that ascertainability requires plaintiffs to identify an
administratively feasible mechanism that allows the court to identify all
putative class members.421 In most, if not all, small-claims consumer class
actions, this requirement would be extremely difficult to satisfy.422
While the Third Circuit is not the first court to deny class certification
based on ascertainability, the need to identify each individual plaintiff is a
novel approach.423 Traditionally, ascertainability has demanded that
plaintiffs present the court with a precise class definition.424 Based on the
class definition, courts must be able to readily identify absent class
members.425 This means that a court must be able to identify whether
someone could be a class member based on objective criteria.426 An
inability to identify potential class members based on the class definition
must result in a failure to satisfy ascertainability.427 The traditional
application of ascertainability weeds out imprecise class definitions that do
not allow for proper representative litigation to occur.
Although the Third Circuit’s understanding of ascertainability will likely
prevent many frivolous class action lawsuits, this interpretation does not
properly apply the requirement. Ascertainability developed in response to
class definitions that prohibited a court from identifying class members
absent individualized findings of fact.428 Such class definitions would
prevent proper distribution of damages and determinations by future courts
about who is bound by a valid judgment.429 In this regard, the doctrine
promoted the efficient use of Rule 23.
Because class certification often results in settlement, little discussion of
ascertainability exists at the circuit level.430 The growing use of
ascertainability to deny class certification is an important topic that
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.

See supra notes 160–79 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 237–329 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 237–329 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 296–329 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 183–235 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 183–235 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 183–235 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 183–235 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 183–235 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 160–79 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 160–79 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 183–85 and accompanying text.
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demands more attention from circuit courts. The Third Circuit decisions
are important examples of the questions that remain regarding the exact
application of ascertainability. Different understandings of the requirement
will result in class certification in some circuits but not others. The
potential bar to certification that the Third Circuit’s interpretation of
ascertainability has created should push more circuits to further flesh out
the requirement. Any failure to do so may lead to a significant increase in
the denial of class certification based on ascertainability.

